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A “PROCEDURAL NIGHTMARE”: DUELING COURTS AND THE 
APPLICATION OF THE FIRST-FILED RULE
Andrew J. Fuller*
Abstract
Pretend that Party A sues Party B in Court 1. Instead of countersuing, 
however, B then sues A in Court 2. The problem this Note examines is 
whether Court 1 may enjoin B from continuing to litigate in Court 2 if 
Court 2 has already declined to stay the case or transfer it to Court 1. 
This question has sharply divided the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal. 
How the issue is resolved will have serious consequences for high-stakes 
litigation in the United States. If one district court may overrule a court 
of coordinate rank, strategically sophisticated parties might file suits in 
multiple courts to coerce poorer adversaries into settlement. On the other 
hand, if a federal district court cannot enjoin litigation which is 
simultaneously proceeding before a peer, the litigation might continue in 
both districts. Forcing a poorer adversary to litigate one case in two places 
at the same time could be a dream come true for a wealthy litigant willing 
to partake in such strategic gamesmanship to bully poorer adversaries into 
settling their claims.
This Note proposes issue preclusion as a solution to this problem. 
Granting preclusive effect to the first decision of either court to address 
venue would not only prevent parties from being able to relitigate venue 
across districts but would also eliminate the incentive to file duplicative 
litigation in the first place.
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INTRODUCTION
This Note analyzes the split between U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal on
what should occur when two federal district courts disagree about where 
a case should be litigated after parties have filed the same dispute in two 
courts. When more than one suit has been filed between the same parties 
in more than one forum, the first-filed rule establishes which action 
should proceed.1 First-filed rule disputes can develop into notoriously 
complex affairs.2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit called 
one such dispute a “procedural nightmare.”3 These disputes do not relate 
to the merits of the parties’ claims, but arise when parties disagree about 
where to litigate.4 The rule is irrelevant where either a constitutional 
requirement or a federal statute prevent a case from proceeding in a 
particular court. The rule aims to prevent duplicative proceedings by 
preventing two cases, both related to the same controversy and parties, 
from continuing simultaneously in multiple forums.5
Because litigating the first-filed rule does not reach the merits of any 
claim, parties likely invest their time and resources into litigating the 
issue only when they have a substantial stake in the case proceeding in a 
preferred forum or before a particular judge.6 Thus, forum and judge 
shopping are likely critical motivations for parties who refuse to accede 
                                                                                                                     
1. 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3854,
Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2016) (“[W]hen two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a 
dispute involving the same parties and issues, as a general proposition, the forum in which 
the first-filed action is lodged has priority.”); e.g., N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge N.
Am., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The first-filed rule states that, in determining the proper 
venue, ‘[w]here there are two competing lawsuits, the first suit should have priority.’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006)))); Cardoza 
v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 08–5120 SC, 2009 WL 723843, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009) (“The 
first-to-file rule ‘allows a district court to transfer, stay, or dismiss an action when a similar 
complaint has already been filed in another federal court.’” (quoting Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld 
Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 1991))).
2. The Semmes Motors case is a good example. See Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1200–01 (2d Cir. 1970).
3. Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Co., 945 F.2d 1272, 1273 (3d Cir. 1991).
4. See supra note 1.
5. See Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Irwin Fin. Corp., No. 08–146 GMS, 2009 WL 763899, at 
*4 (D. Del. Mar. 23, 2009) (“[The first filed rule’s] purpose is to avoid differing outcomes on the 
same issue by two sister courts, thereby minimizing duplicative litigation in different fora, and 
saving judicial resources.”).
6. See Hershey Foods, 945 F.2d at 1272 (describing the litigation over the first-filed rule 
as “a struggle for the perceived advantage of litigating rights in the HERSHEY’S trademark in 
their preferred federal district courts”).
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to their adversary’s choice of forum.7 While the first-filed rule generally 
promotes efficiency and judicial comity by ensuring that two or more 
courts use the same yardstick to decide where a case should be litigated, 
disagreements between district courts on its application threaten judicial 
comity and the conservation of resources.
This Note examines a split between U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal on 
whether, when a case is filed in two different federal courts which 
disagree about where the case should proceed pursuant to the first-filed 
rule, one district court may enjoin the litigation from proceeding before 
the other court after the other has already ruled that the case should 
proceed in its own forum.8 The resolution to this circuit split may have 
serious ramifications. For example, equity and justice could suffer if 
Court 1 can enjoin a party from litigating a case in Court 2 which Court 
2 had already decided to hear. Allowing parties to relitigate venue across 
the United States could result in unscrupulous parties filing parallel suits 
simply to create time-consuming and expensive court battles over venue.9
Creating a venue dispute could delay a court from entering a judgment 
on the merits or coerce an opponent into settling by dramatically raising 
its litigation expenses.10 On the other hand, if Court 1 could not enjoin 
Court 2, future plaintiffs might choose to file cases in both Courts 1 and 
2 to force adversaries to spend resources litigating the same dispute in 
two forums.
The circuit courts disagree not only on the equitable risks of either 
allowing or prohibiting inter-district injunctions, but also on related 
questions involving intra-judicial branch comity, preserving judicial 
resources, avoiding conflicting rulings on the same questions of law or 
fact, and determining what constitutes an appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292,11 a federal statute governing appeals. Part I of this Note addresses 
the first-filed rule. Part II addresses the circuit split. Part III proposes a 
solution: issue preclusion.
                                                                                                                     
7. See id.
8. See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1005–07 (8th Cir. 1993);
Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Modern Welding Co., Inc., 502 F.2d 178, 180–82 (4th Cir. 1974); Nat’l 
Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 45–46 (2d Cir. 1961).
9. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 3907 (“Litigation often involves adversaries of 
unequal resources and conflicting interests in securing or avoiding prompt judgment. Frequent 
appeals can be used by a party with greater resources, or an interest in delay, either deliberately 
or with the effect of harassing an adversary into cheap settlement or outright surrender. Relatively 
impecunious litigants, indeed, may find the initial prospect of litigation entailing more than one 
trial and one appeal too forbidding to encounter.” (footnote omitted)).
10. Id.
11. See Nw. Airlines, 989 F.2d at 1005; Ellicott, 502 F.2d at 180–81; Nat’l Equip. Rental,
287 F.2d at 45.
3
Fuller: A “Procedural Nightmare”: Dueling Courts and the Application of t
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
660 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
I. THE FIRST-FILED RULE
Under the first-filed rule, when two courts have jurisdiction over the 
same case, the court in which the case was first filed should be the court 
to hear it except under special circumstances.12 Because the first-filed 
rule intends to prevent duplicative litigation, it applies only where the 
actions before both courts involve the same or substantially similar 
parties and issues.13 By ensuring that parties to a single controversy 
handle their dispute in one forum, the rule prevents two courts of equal 
rank from issuing conflicting rulings and promotes judicial comity.14
Further, the first-filed rule prevents the wasteful preclusion 
consequences that may arise from courts exercising concurrent 
jurisdiction.15 “Preclusion” is a term used to group a variety of doctrines16
which are intended to prevent parties from relitigating claims or issues 
which a court has already adjudicated.17 Perhaps in response to the 
                                                                                                                     
12. See sources cited supra note 1.
13. See Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Serta, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 8751(PAE), 2012 WL 844284, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2012) (“For the rule to apply, the ‘claims, parties, and available relief’ must 
not ‘significantly differ between the actions.’ However, the issues need not be identical, and the 
named parties need not be entirely the same provided that they represent the same interests.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Byron v. Genovese Drug Stores, Inc., No. 10–CV–03313, 2011 WL 
4962499, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2011))); Preci-Dip, SA v. Tri-Star Elecs. Int’l, Inc., No. 08 C 
4192, 2008 WL 5142401, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2008); eNom, Inc. v. Philbrick, No. C08–
1288RSL, 2008 WL 4933976, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 17, 2008) (“[T]he ‘sameness’ requirement 
does not mandate that the two actions be identical, but is satisfied if they are ‘substantially 
similar.’” (quoting Inherent.com v. Martindale–Hubbell, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 
2006))); Intersearch Worldwide, Ltd. v. Intersearch Grp., Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 949, 958–60 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008) (holding first-filed rule applied where parties and claims were sufficiently similar).
14. See W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 728–29 (5th Cir. 
1985) (“The federal courts long have recognized that the principle of comity requires federal 
district courts—courts of coordinate jurisdiction and equal rank—to exercise care to avoid 
interference with each other’s affairs.”).
15. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4404 (“[A]s between actions pending at the same 
time, res judicata attaches to the first judgment regardless of the sequence in which the actions 
were commenced.”); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 376 F.3d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(“When two suits proceed simultaneously, as in this case, res judicata effect is given to the first 
judgment rendered. Maintaining such a litigation strategy almost assures that at some point one 
of the cases will become barred by a judgment in the other; the successful party will find that all 
its claims and defenses have merged into the judgment, while the unsuccessful party will find that 
its have been extinguished.” (citations omitted)).
16. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4402 (“[T]he broad ‘res judicata’ phrase refers 
to the distinctive effects of a judgment separately characterized as ‘claim preclusion’ and ‘issue 
preclusion.’”).
17. See Stewart E. Sterk & Kimberly J. Brunelle, Zoning Finality: Reconceptualizing Res 
Judicata Doctrine in Land Use Cases, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1139, 1147–48 (2011) (“Preclusion 
doctrine rests on a combination of efficiency and fairness concerns. First, precluding relitigation 
of previously decided issues conserves judicial resources. . . . [Moreover], from a fairness 
4
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withering criticism of its preclusion cases, the U.S. Supreme Court 
attempted in Taylor v. Sturgell18 to simplify preclusion theory by 
condensing it into two categories: (1) claim preclusion; and (2) issue 
preclusion, which traditionally consisted of collateral estoppel and direct 
estoppel.19 If two courts exercised jurisdiction over the same case, claim 
or issue preclusion may grant the first judgment on any question by either 
court preclusive effect in the court which had not yet reached the matter.20
The time and resources parties spent in litigating the question would be 
wasted in the second court to rule on the matter because the judgment in 
the first court would preclude the second court from making an
alternative decision.21
The first-filed rule not only helps to protect litigants from the 
expensive consequences of preclusion, but also saves them the costs of 
litigating whether preclusion applies. Determining preclusion’s relevance 
can be complicated. Over time, the law of preclusion has become rife 
with disagreements over terminology.22 For example, critics have harshly 
described collateral estoppel as “anything but predictable and easy to 
apply,”23 “marred by a vexing interplay between the various individual 
rules,”24 “commonly phrase[d] . . . in ambiguous terms that mandate 
meaningless exercises in verbal categorization,”25 clouded by 
“uncertainty and confusion,”26 “extremely unpredictable,”27 “vague,”28
“clumsy and disorderly,”29 and beset by “too many rules . . . [which] 
                                                                                                                     
perspective, preclusion protects a successful litigant from having to expend time and resources 
defending against duplicative litigation.”).
18. 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
19. Id. at 892. “Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses 
‘successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the 
same issues as the earlier suit.’” Id. (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)).
“Issue preclusion, in contrast, bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated 
and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,’ even if the issue recurs 
in the context of a different claim.” Id. (quoting New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 748–49).
20. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 376 F.3d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 2004).
21. See id.
22. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4402.
23. Eli J. Richardson, Taking Issue with Issue Preclusion: Reinventing Collateral Estoppel,
65 MISS. L.J. 41, 42 (1995).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 43 (footnote omitted).
26. Id.
27. Brian Levine, Preclusion Confusion: A Call for Per Se Rules Preventing the Application 
of Collateral Estoppel to Findings Made in Nontraditional Litigation, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
435, 439.
28. Id.
29. Colin Hugh Buckley, Issue Preclusion and Issues of Law: A Doctrinal Framework 
Based on Rules of Recognition, Jurisdiction and Legal History, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 875, 876 (1987).
5
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compete with and undermine each other.”30 The meaning of res judicata 
has been similarly unclear.31 Some scholars describe res judicata as 
having constituted what has developed into claim preclusion,32 while 
others believe res judicata constituted both claim and issue preclusion.33
While the Court attempted to simplify preclusion theory in Taylor v. 
Sturgell,34 many attorneys, academics, and jurists continue to use the old 
terminology.35 Confusion persists.36 By curbing the likelihood of 
concurrent litigation, the first-filed rule saves parties the burden of 
litigating preclusion’s relevancy.
A. Factors Which Permit a Second-Filed Case to Take Precedence 
Over a First-Filed Action
The first-filed rule is an equitable rule with notable exceptions. In 
Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co.,37 the 
Supreme Court counseled that district courts must exercise discretion in 
determining where a case should proceed after it is filed in more than one 
court: 
Wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation 
of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of 
litigation, does not counsel rigid mechanical solution of such 
problems. The factors relevant to wise administration here 
are equitable in nature. Necessarily, an ample degree 
of discretion, appropriate for disciplined and experienced 
judges, must be left to the lower courts.38
Thus, first-filed rule decisions are currently subject to review under an 
abuse of discretion standard.39 Although all U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal 
acknowledge that certain circumstances justify departing from the rule,40
                                                                                                                     
30. Levine, supra note 27, at 449–50.
31. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4402.
32. See id. (“For some years, a number of courts continued to limit the res judicata phrase 
so as to exclude the doctrines of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel. This usage is potentially 
confusing, and it is better to use res judicata in its broader sense to encompass both sets of 
doctrine.” (footnote omitted)).
33. See id.
34. See 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).
35. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4402.
36. See id.
37. 342 U.S. 180 (1952).
38. Id. at 183–84.
39. Id.
40. See Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[T]he first filed action 
is generally preferred in a choice-of-venue decision.” (emphasis added) (quoting Cianbro Corp. 
v. Curran–Lavoie, Inc., 814 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1987))); Thomas v. Apple-Metro, Inc., No. 14–
CV–4120 (VEC), 2015 WL 505384, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2015) (“The first-filed rule is a
6
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two circuits differ slightly from the others on how strongly they rely upon 
the first-filed rule in deciding where a case should proceed.41 In all 
circuits except for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the rule 
operates for all practical purposes as a presumption that a case should 
proceed where it was first filed.42 Parties may defeat the presumption by 
showing the case should proceed elsewhere due to the same two factors 
courts normally consider when deciding if a change of venue is 
appropriate43: the interest of justice and the convenience of parties and 
witnesses.44
The Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit do not treat 
the rule as a presumption which can be defeated by the interest of justice 
and the convenience of parties and witnesses. The Seventh Circuit has 
held the first-filed rule is a factor of equal weight with those two 
interests.45 Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit has held the rule 
should be balanced equally with equitable considerations, broadly 
speaking.46
                                                                                                                     
well-established Second Circuit doctrine . . . . [It is] a presumption, rather than a rigid rule . . . .”); 
EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 972 (3d Cir. 1988); Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Modern Welding 
Co., 502 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1974); W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 
721, 728–29 (5th Cir. 1985); Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 
511 F.3d 535, 551 (6th Cir. 2007); Research Automation, Inc. v. Schrader–Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 
626 F.3d 973, 980 (7th Cir. 2010); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1006–
07 (8th Cir. 1993); Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Hospah Coal Co. v. Chaco Energy Co., 673 F.2d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 1982); Manuel v.
Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 2005); Handy v. Shaw, Bransford, Veilleux, &
Roth, 325 F.3d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
41. See Research Automation, 626 F.3d at 982 (“[T]he factors to be weighed in a first-to-
file analysis are the same factors that apply to the decision of whether transfer is appropriate under 
section 1404(a). . . . We have upheld the use of the same factors in prior cases without giving the 
first-filed case any supplementary weight, and we decline to augment the weight it receives 
here.”); Handy, 325 F.3d at 350 (“Although some courts make this determination by using the so-
called ‘first-to-file’ rule, we have emphasized that the district court must balance equitable 
considerations rather than using ‘a mechanical “rule of thumb.”’” (citations omitted) (first quoting 
Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 606 (5th Cir. 1999); then quoting 
Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Sec. Nat’l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1975))).
42. See cases cited supra note 40.
43. See cases cited supra note 40; see also 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 3854 
(“Exceptions to the first-filed rule apply when the [28 U.S.C.] Section 1404(a) factors weigh in 
favor of giving priority to the second action. Thus, courts have found exceptions to the first-filed 
rule based on forum shopping, anticipatory conduct, or when other special circumstances justify 
giving priority to the second action.”).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
45. See Research Automation, 626 F.3d at 982.
46. See Handy, 325 F.3d at 350.
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B.  How First-Filed Disputes Commonly Arise
First-filing disputes generally arise under one of two circumstances. 
Under the first scenario, a Plaintiff simply files a case against the same 
or similar parties in more than one court.47 Under the second scenario, a 
Plaintiff files a case in one court, and then, instead of filing counterclaims 
in the original suit, the Defendant chooses to file those claims as a new 
suit in another court.48 Because the original Plaintiff filed his suit first, 
the original Plaintiff’s suit would have priority under the first-filed rule. 
Unless the exceptions to the rule were relevant, the rule would suggest 
that the case proceed in the court where it was first filed—the court in 
which the original Plaintiff filed. 
The distinctions that may exist between the two scenarios are not 
relevant for the purposes of this Note because in both cases, the tools the 
parties have to end the duplication of proceedings are identical49 and raise 
the same conflict from which the current circuit split arose. Under either 
scenario, a party may use a motion to stay,50 to transfer,51 or to enjoin 
proceedings in another court52 in an attempt to end whichever of the cases 
it would prefer to end.53 For example, a party who would prefer the case 
to proceed in the court of first filing may take action either there or in the 
                                                                                                                     
47. See Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1200 (2d Cir. 1970).
48. See Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Modern Welding Co., 502 F.2d 178, 179–80 (4th Cir. 1974).
49. In each case, the parties used motions to stay, to transfer, and to enjoin an opposing 
party from continuing to litigate in a forum which the movant did not prefer. See Nw. Airlines, 
Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1003 (8th Cir. 1993); Ellicott, 502 F.2d at 179–80; Nat’l 
Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 1961).
50. The power to stay a case is an inherent power of the federal courts. See PBM 
Nutritionals, LLC v. Dornoch Ltd., 667 F. Supp. 2d 621, 631 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“A motion to stay, 
though not expressly provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is a power inherent in 
the courts ‘under their general equity powers and in the efficient management of their dockets.’”
(quoting Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., 715 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1983))).
51. A motion to transfer under these circumstances would be pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a), and not § 1406(a), because either forum would constitute a permissible venue. See
§ 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court 
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or 
to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”); 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
1, § 3827 (noting that although confusion amongst courts exists regarding distinctions between § 
1404(a) and § 1406, “[a] prerequisite to invoking Section 1406(a) is that the venue chosen by the
plaintiff is improper”).
52. Courts may issue injunctions pursuant to their equitable powers. See 11A WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 1, § 2942; see also Nw. Airlines, 989 F.2d at 1004 (“The discretionary power of 
the federal court in which the first-filed action is pending to enjoin the parties from proceeding 
with a later-filed action in another federal court is firmly established.”).
53. See Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1202 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[W]e
can see no reason why the end result should be different when the party seeking to preserve the 
primacy of the first court moves the second court to stay its hand rather than asking the first court 
to enjoin prosecution of the second case.”).
8
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court of second filing. In the court of first filing, the party may make a 
motion for that court to enforce the first-filed rule by enjoining its 
adversary from continuing to litigate in the second court.54 In the court of 
second filing, the party may move for the court to stay the case or transfer 
it for consolidation with the first-filed action.55
A party who would prefer for the action to proceed only in the second 
court would likely make similar maneuvers. He may move for the court 
of first filing to stay or transfer the case to the second court.56 The party 
could also move the second court to enjoin the first-filing plaintiff from 
continuing to litigate the case in the first court.57 If a party prefers that the 
case proceed in the second court, he would need to show the interest of 
justice and convenience of parties and witnesses justify an exception to 
the first-filed rule.58 However, if the litigant were proceeding in the 
Seventh Circuit or District of Columbia Circuit, the litigant would need 
to show an exception was justified pursuant to those circuits’ slightly 
different understandings of the rule and its exceptions.59
A party moving one court to stay, to transfer, or to enjoin a parallel 
proceeding often faces its adversary engaging in the same strategic 
behavior.60 Litigation involving the first-filed rule can quickly escalate 
into a very expensive exercise in forum and judge shopping. For example, 
in Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Co.,61 a dispute over rights 
to the HERSHEY’S trademark, two companies engaged in what the Third 
Circuit called a “struggle for the perceived advantage of litigating rights 
in the HERSHEY’S trademark in their preferred federal courts.”62
Hershey Foods filed first in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania.63 Hershey Creamery responded, not by filing 
counterclaims, but by filing its own suit in another district entirely, the 
Southern District of New York.64 Hershey Foods moved in Pennsylvania 
for the court to enjoin the New York case.65 The Pennsylvania court, in
the Third Circuit, granted the injunction and blocked its Second Circuit 
                                                                                                                     
54. See Nw. Airlines, 989 F.2d at 1004; Semmes Motors, 429 F.2d at 1200.
55. See Nw. Airlines, 989 F.2d at 1004; Semmes Motors, 429 F.2d at 1201.
56. See Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Modern Welding Co., Inc., 502 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 
1974).
57. See Semmes Motors, 429 F.2d at 1200.
58. See cases cited supra note 40.
59. See cases cited supra note 41.
60. See Nw. Airlines, 989 F.2d at 1003–04; Ellicott, 502 F.2d at 179–80; Nat’l Equip.
Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 1961).
61. 945 F.2d 1272 (3d Cir. 1991).
62. Id. at 1272.
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sister court in New York from being able to hear the case.66 Hershey 
Creamery sought interlocutory review from the Third Circuit of the 
Pennsylvania court’s injunction.67 A seemingly exasperated Third Circuit 
called the case a “procedural nightmare”68 and sidestepped the question 
dividing the circuit courts by holding it lacked appellate jurisdiction to 
review the injunction in the first place.69
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal disagree on whether a court of first
filing may enjoin a party from continuing to litigate a claim in another 
court if the other court has already held that venue is proper in its forum 
in light of the interest of justice and the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, the exceptions to the first-filed rule.70 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit have held courts of first filing may enjoin a party from 
litigating in a court of second filing, even after the second court 
previously declined to stay the case or transfer it to the first court.71 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, has held that 
district courts abuse their discretion by enjoining a case from a 
proceeding before a coordinate federal court which had already ruled that 
a case was properly before it.72




69. Whether an injunction a court grants to enforce the first-filed rule constitutes an 
appealable injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) is another question on which there is a circuit 
split. While the Third Circuit has held it lacks appellate jurisdiction to review these injunctions, 
the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held they do have jurisdiction. Compare
id. at 1276–79 (“At this juncture, we intimate no view of the propriety of the district court’s order 
enjoining Hershey Creamery from proceeding in the Southern District of New York. . . . Because 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s order does not grant part of the relief requested by Hershey 
Foods, it does not qualify as an appealable ‘injunction’ . . . .”), with Research Automation, Inc. v. 
Schrader–Bridgeport Int’l, 626 F.3d 973, 976 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we 
have jurisdiction over the appeal of the district court’s order denying Research Automation’s 
motion for an injunction.”), Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1003 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (exercising jurisdiction over an appeal of an injunction issued to enforce the first-filed 
rule), and Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Modern Welding Co., 502 F.2d 178, 180 n.1 (4th Cir. 1974) 
(“Jurisdiction of the present appeal is afforded under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1).”).
70. See supra note 43.
71. See Nw. Airlines, 989 F.2d at 1003–04, 1007; Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 
F.2d 43, 44–46 (2d Cir. 1961).
72. See Ellicott, 502 F.2d at 181–82.
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A. The Second Circuit
In National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler,73 the Second Circuit 
upheld a district court’s ability to enjoin a case in a peer court which had 
already held the case should proceed before it.74 National Equipment sued 
A.L. Fowler and other defendants in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York after the defendants allegedly defaulted on 
a contract.75 After answering the complaint and filing counterclaims in 
New York, the Defendants sued National Equipment in the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Alabama.76 They alleged National 
Equipment breached the same contract which was the subject of National 
Equipment’s case in New York.77 National moved for the Alabama court 
to stay or transfer the case to New York, the forum of first filing.78 The 
Alabama court denied the motion.79 National then moved the New York 
court to enjoin the defendants in that court (the plaintiffs in Alabama) 
from continuing to litigate in Alabama.80 National also asked the New 
York court to transfer the Alabama action to New York.81 The court 
granted the motion and the defendants appealed.82
The Second Circuit held the New York court lacked the ability to 
transfer another court’s case to itself.83 It also held the injunction was a 
proper enforcement of the first-filed rule.84 Chief Judge Joseph Lumbard 
dissented in part.85 He agreed the transfer was improper86 but argued the 
injunction was inappropriate as well:
We are all agreed that a district court may protect its own 
jurisdiction by enjoining parties from subsequently litigating 
the same controversy before another district court. . . . 
In this case, however, the issue . . . had first been tested 
by National in the Alabama district court. . . .
. . .
The technical rules controlling the application of the 
                                                                                                                     
73. 287 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1961).
74. Id. at 45–46.








83. Id. at 46.
84. Id. at 45–47.
85. Id. at 47–49 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. Id. at 49.
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doctrine of res judicata may indeed prevent it from applying 
here since the Alabama order was merely interlocutory, but 
the principles supporting the rule are surely applicable
. . . . National chose to present to the Alabama court its 
contention that the entire action be concluded in the Eastern 
District of New York. It then had the opportunity to urge that 
court to stay its own proceeding because of the priority-of-
action rule and other considerations. There is no basis in the 
record for presuming that the court in Alabama did not weigh 
all these elements . . . . What the majority affirms, therefore, 
is a procedure which grants the plaintiff two federal forums 
in which to present the very same contentions addressed to 
the court’s discretion. If he prevails in either of the two, he
is given the relief he desires. 
Not only is such double litigation unfair to the party 
forced to rebut the same arguments in two proceedings 
before different courts, but it presents an opportunity for 
unseemly conflict between coordinate federal courts and 
causes wasteful delay in judicial administration. . . . It was 
improper for the New York court to consider the same issue 
and decide that the balance of convenience favored the New 
York proceeding.87
B.  The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit confronted the question in Ellicott Machine Corp. 
v. Modern Welding Co.88 The case is another example of how these 
disputes can evolve into extraordinarily complex affairs. Ellicott sued 
                                                                                                                     
87. Id. Res judicata does not apply to judgments which are not final and on the merits of a 
party’s claims. See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (“There is 
little to be added to the doctrine of res judicata as developed in the case law of this Court. A final 
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues 
that were or could have been raised in that action.”). Chief Judge Lumbard is likely suggesting 
that the district court’s ruling on National’s 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfer motion was not a final 
judgment on the merits of a claim in the underlying case. A judgment on venue, while important 
to the case’s outcome, is not a final judgment on a claim’s merits. National’s motion did not speak 
to the law or facts of the contract dispute actually at issue in the case. See Am. Can Co. v. 
Mansukhani, 814 F.2d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Res judicata has no bearing . . . because an 
element required to invoke res judicata is lacking—there is no final judgment on the merits of the 
case. . . . Res judicata has no application to interlocutory rulings rendered during the course of the 
same lawsuit.”); see also Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 340 n.9 (1960) (“Several reasons why 
principles of res judicata do not apply may be stated in a few sentences. The orders of the Texas 
and Illinois District Courts on the respective motions to transfer and to remand . . . were (1) 
interlocutory, (2) not upon the merits, and (3) were entered in the same case by courts of 
coordinate jurisdiction.”).
88. 502 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1974).
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Modern in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.89 Modern 
responded by filing claims against Ellicott in a Kentucky state court.90
Modern’s claims in Kentucky and Ellicott’s Maryland claims involved 
the same case or controversy.91 Ellicott removed Modern’s second-filed 
Kentucky state suit to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Kentucky and moved for the Western District either to quash service of 
process or transfer the case to the first-filed court, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Maryland.92 The court denied Ellicott’s motion.93
Modern then moved for the Maryland court of first filing to dismiss the 
action, quash service of process, or transfer the case to the Western 
District of Kentucky.94 Ellicott moved for the Maryland court to enjoin 
Modern from continuing to litigate its second-filed action in Kentucky.95
The Maryland court denied Modern’s motions and granted Ellicott’s
motion to enjoin Modern.96 Modern appealed the injunction.97
The Fourth Circuit split with the Second Circuit.98 Citing Chief Judge 
Lumbard’s dissent in National Equipment Rental, the court held the 
injunction was an abuse of discretion in light of the interests of finality, 
judicial comity, and fairness towards litigants.99 A party seeking a court 
to stay or transfer a case is bound by that court’s determination that venue 
under the first-filed rule is appropriate in its forum.100 The Fourth Circuit 
said it was disrespectful for a court to enjoin a party from litigating a case 
in a coordinate court which had already ruled the case should be litigated 
before it.101 Thus, because the Kentucky court previously denied the 
motion to transfer the case to Maryland, “respect for the judgment of
coordinate federal courts” required the Maryland court to allow Modern 
to litigate in Kentucky.102
The court also held that issuing an injunction in these circumstances 
would waste judicial and litigant resources.103 If a party were able to 
litigate where it wished by raising the question of venue in multiple 
                                                                                                                     









98. See id. at 181–82.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 182.
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courts, opposing parties would be dragged into spending time and money 
relitigating the question.104 In addition, a federal court would have to 
duplicate the work of a coordinate federal court by reevaluating how the 
first-filed rule, justice, and the convenience of parties and witnesses apply 
to the controversy before both courts.105
Importantly, the Fourth Circuit also felt 28 U.S.C. § 1291, a federal 
statute governing appeals, prevents district courts from issuing 
injunctions under these circumstances.106 While the court held it may 
exercise jurisdiction over an appeal from the granting of the injunction,107
it recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 prohibits parties from appealing the 
granting or denying of a motion to stay or transfer under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a).108 The court felt Ellicott had violated 28 U.S.C. § 1291 by 
effectively conducting an inter-district appeal:
Ellicott asked the district judge in Kentucky to exercise his 
discretion in granting or denying a motion for change of 
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). It is well settled that the 
decision of a district judge on a motion for change of venue 
under section 1404(a) is not appealable as a final judgment.
. . . 
What Ellicott has effectively done is appeal from one 
district judge to another. Worse, because relief was obtained 
by injunction, an otherwise unappealable decision on venue 
has now been brought up on appeal. In ruling against 
Modern’s motion for transfer to the Western District of 
Kentucky, Judge Miller in effect reassessed the convenience 
factors which had already been considered, albeit impliedly, 
by Judge Gordon in his November 12 order denying 
Ellicott’s motion to transfer to Maryland. The first-to-file 
principle relied upon by Judge Miller is a rule of sound 
judicial administration, but it must yield in the face of the 
historic policy of the federal courts, expressed in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, that appeal will lie only from “final decisions of the 
district courts” and then only in the courts of appeal.109
Thus, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the dissent in National 
Equipment Rental that a party which has sought a ruling from a court on 
                                                                                                                     
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 181–82. 
107. Id. at 180 n.1 (“Jurisdiction of the present appeal is afforded under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)
(1).”).
108. Id. at 180–81.
109. Id.
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a motion to stay or transfer must abide by that court’s decision regarding 
whether the case should remain active in its forum.110 The court, however, 
expanded upon Chief Judge Lumbard’s Second Circuit dissent by holding 
that granting the injunction would violate a federal statute.111
C.  The Eighth Circuit
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.,112 the Eighth 
Circuit criticized the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Ellicott and sided with 
the Second Circuit.113 In Northwest Airlines, American Airlines’ general 
counsel wrote a letter to the general counsel of Northwest Airlines 
complaining of Northwest’s recent poaching of American’s
employees.114 American requested Northwest cease hiring American 
Airlines workers and said American had strong grounds to sue Northwest 
for its behavior.115 After sending a reply by mail, Northwest filed suit 
against American in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Minnesota.116 Northwest sought a declaratory judgment that its hiring of 
the employees was legal.117 American then sought injunctive relief from 
Northwest’s hiring practices and damages in the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas.118 American moved in the Minnesota 
court, the court of first filing, for the case to be dismissed or transferred 
to Texas.119 The Minnesota court rejected the motion.120 Northwest 
moved for the Texas court to stay the case or transfer it to Minnesota.121
The Texas court rejected the motion.122 Northwest then filed a motion in 
Minnesota to enjoin American from continuing to litigate American’s
second-filed case in Texas.123 The Minnesota court granted the injunction 
and American appealed.124
The Eighth Circuit upheld the injunction.125 Like the Second Circuit 
in National Equipment Rental, the court concluded it was proper for the 
                                                                                                                     
110. Id.
111. Id. at 180–82.
112. 989 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1993).
113. Id. at 1005–07.




118. Id. at 1003–04.






125. Id. at 1007.
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Minnesota court, the court of first filing, to issue the injunction enforcing
the first-filed rule.126 In justifying its strict adherence to the rule, the court 
discussed the waste of resources which duplicative litigation would entail 
if allowed to continue.127
American had argued Northwest’s motion for the injunction 
circumvented 28 U.S.C. § 1291 by constituting an inter-district appeal128
and cited the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Ellicott for support.129 Further, 
American claimed Northwest’s appeal was before the wrong court.130 By 
appealing, for all practical purposes, the Texas court’s denial of the stay 
or transfer motion to the Minnesota district court, Northwest managed to 
get the Texas opinion before the Eighth Circuit instead of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the U.S. circuit court which takes appeals 
from federal district courts in Texas.131
The Eighth Circuit aligned itself with the Second Circuit. The court 
rejected the Fourth Circuit’s view in Ellicott that an injunction in these 
circumstances constitutes a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.132 The court 
took a literal approach to what constitutes an appeal and concluded the 
Texas court’s ruling on the propriety of venue was never appealed.133
Although Northwest asked the Minnesota court to enjoin the Texas case 
after having asked the Texas court to stay the case or transfer it to 
Minnesota,134 Northwest’s injunction motion did not constitute an appeal 
because the Minnesota judge never actually reviewed the Texas court’s
earlier opinion.135 Further, the Eighth Circuit suggested the Fourth Circuit 
inadequately valued the first-filed rule and that its approach would 
undermine judicial economy and waste litigant resources.136
Thus, while the Second and Eighth Circuits upheld district court 
decisions to enjoin the continued litigation of a case in a peer court which 
had itself previously held venue before it was proper, the Fourth Circuit 
has overturned such decisions as an abuse of discretion.
III. THE SOLUTION: PRECLUSION
The ideal solution to these inter-district disagreements would not only
frustrate efforts to relitigate the first-filed rule, but prevent merits-related 
                                                                                                                     
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1006–07.




132. Id. at 1006.
133. See id. at 1005–06.
134. Id. at 1004.
135. Id. at 1005–06.
136. Id. at 1006–07.
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litigation from proceeding before multiple courts simultaneously. 
Granting preclusive effect to the first decision applying the first-filed rule
would achieve both these aims. Future circuits to rule on this question 
should give this proposal serious consideration. The Second, Fourth, and 
Eighth Circuits have embraced solutions that only achieve one of these 
objectives or the other.
The Second Circuit and Eighth Circuit believe they are preventing 
duplicative litigation by allowing a district court to enjoin a party from 
continuing to litigate in another court, even if that other court has already 
ruled the case was appropriately before it.137 In a limited sense, these 
circuits are correct. Such an injunction ensures that only one of the 
forums would decide the case’s merits. These circuits are misguided in a 
broader sense, however. By upholding district court decisions that grant 
such injunctions, the circuits permit parties to relitigate the first-filed rule 
in federal district courts across the country.138 Thus, the opinions in 
National Equipment Rental and Northwest Airlines do not solve the 
fundamental duplication problem. To the contrary, they foster disputes 
over the first-filed rule and waste judicial resources by allowing a party 
which has obtained a decision not to its liking to seek an alternative 
decision from another judge in another forum.139 The decisions permit 
the relitigation of a single question of law: which of two disputes, related 
to the same common nucleus of operative facts, should take priority under 
the first-filed rule? From this perspective, permitting the relitigation of 
the first-filed rule constitutes acceptance of duplicative litigation.
On the other hand, the risk of embracing the Fourth Circuit’s approach 
is that allowing two cases to go forward simultaneously creates the type 
of duplicative litigation the Second and Eighth Circuits feared.140
Arguably, allowing two cases to proceed simultaneously creates an even 
greater risk of wasting judicial and litigant resources than allowing the 
first-filed rule to be relitigated. At least when parties relitigate the first-
filed rule, they are relitigating only one question of law and not the entire 
array of questions which may arise in a dispute.
Granting preclusive effect to the first decision of a court regarding 
which of two concurrent cases should proceed would best prevent 
duplicative litigation.141 If the dilemma confronting federal courts is how 
                                                                                                                     
137. Id.
138. See Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Modern Welding Co., 502 F.2d 178, 180–81 (4th Cir. 1974).
139. See Nw. Airlines, 989 F.2d at 1006–07; Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 
43, 46–47 (2d Cir. 1961).
140. See Nw. Airlines, 989 F.2d at 1006.
141. See Buckley, supra note 29, at 875 (“To guard against needless duplicative litigation, 
courts have developed certain finality doctrines. Res judicata prevents interested parties from 
relitigating claims or causes of action that previously had resulted in a final judgment. Collateral 
estoppel prevents those parties from relitigating issues, decided in a first suit, even though the 
second suit may differ from the first.”).
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to prevent relitigation of the first-filed rule without allowing duplicative 
litigation of the same case in multiple fora, then preclusion doctrine is the 
most effective answer. Courts should grant preclusive effect to the 
decision of the first court to rule on where a case should proceed under 
the first-filed rule. If a ruling applying the first-filed rule had preclusive 
effect, the second court to rule on where a case should proceed under it 
would have to honor the prior court’s decision. Because the second court 
to rule would be bound by the decision of the first court, the second court 
would need to stay or transfer the action to the first court if the first court 
had ruled that the case should proceed in its forum. A party would be able 
to appeal a judge’s failure to stay or transfer the case after another court 
had previously ruled on where the case should proceed.142 Such a party 
would also be able to seek a writ of mandamus from the appropriate U.S. 
Court of Appeals.143
Resolving the dilemma facing federal courts by using the preclusion 
doctrine requires identifying which theory of preclusion should apply. 
While Chief Judge Lumbard, in his National Equipment Rental dissent, 
recognized the appeal of claim preclusion,144 he also understood it could 
                                                                                                                     
142. While the granting or denial of an injunction may be appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1), the granting or the denial of a motion to stay or transfer constitutes an interlocutory 
order which is usually unappealable. However, § 1292(b) does allow such an interlocutory appeal 
with the permission of the U.S. District Court and the appropriate U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012); 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 3920 (“Most of the 
opportunities for interlocutory review respond to concerns going beyond the danger of 
consequences outside the conduct of the litigation itself, although such consequences may be 
considered as well. Immediately, these concerns reflect the danger that an erroneous ruling may 
harm the continuing conduct of the suit. An erroneous ruling may mean . . . that subsequent trial-
court proceedings must be duplicated later . . . .”). U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal generally review 
de novo the failure to grant preclusive effect to a ruling entitled to issue preclusion. See Robinette 
v. Jones, 476 F.3d 585, 588–89 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The application of collateral estoppel is a 
question of law that we also review de novo. The term ‘collateral estoppel’ comprehends a variety 
of more specific doctrines including issue preclusion, the estoppel applicable here.” (citation 
omitted)); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Keating, 186 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Whether 
collateral estoppel, which is more accurately designated ‘issue preclusion,’ is available to a litigant 
is a question of law that we review de novo.”). Ideally, U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal would 
authorize interlocutory appeals under § 1292(b) or grant a writ of mandamus under these 
circumstances.
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651; 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 3932 (“Interlocutory review 
of district court orders is at times accomplished by the courts of appeals—or perhaps even a single 
circuit judge—through the extraordinary writ procedure authorized by 28 U.S.C.[] § 1651(a), the 
‘All Writs Act.’ . . . Ordinarily courts resort to the writs of mandamus or prohibition, or to writs 
or acts in the nature of those writs, but in rare circumstances some other form may be 
employed. . . . The most common traditional statement is that the extraordinary writs are available 
to a court of appeals to prevent a district court from acting beyond its jurisdiction, or to compel it 
to take action that it lacks power to withhold.” (footnote omitted)).
144. Chief Judge Lumbard used the term res judicata. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, 287 F.2d at
48 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/8
2017] THE APPLICATION OF THE FIRST-FILED RULE 675
not technically apply.145 Claim preclusion grants preclusive effect only to 
a final judgment on the merits.146 A ruling on where a case should proceed 
under the first-filed rule does not involve a question of merit regarding 
the underlying grievances of the parties to a case.147 Thus, such a ruling 
would constitute an interlocutory ruling to which claim preclusion could 
not apply.148
In recent decades, however, federal courts have eagerly embraced and 
expanded149 the doctrine of issue preclusion.150 Like the first-filed rule, 
issue preclusion prevents duplicative work for courts and litigants and 
promotes efficiency in the judicial process.151 Courts have expanded the 
                                                                                                                     
145. See id. at 48 (“The technical rules controlling the application of the doctrine of res 
judicata may indeed prevent it from applying here since the Alabama order was merely 
interlocutory, but the principles supporting the rule are surely applicable . . . .”).
146. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4427.
147. See supra note 87.
148. See supra note 87.
149. Issue preclusion constitutes what previously consisted of collateral and direct estoppel. 
Under the old formulations, only direct estoppel would apply to the first-filed rule because both 
the first and second filed cases involve the same controversy. Collateral estoppel applies when a 
party seeks to relitigate an issue resolved in a prior action. When an issue is resolved in a case and
a party estops another party from relitigating that same issue in the exact same case, direct estoppel 
is the correct way to describe the estoppel. See In re Duncan, 713 F.2d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(“The doctrine of issue preclusion forecloses relitigation of those issues of fact or law that were 
actually litigated and necessarily decided by a valid and final judgment in a prior action between 
the parties. The doctrine encompasses both the principles of collateral and direct estoppel. Issue 
preclusion in a second action on the same claim is designated direct estoppel, while issue 
preclusion in a second action brought on a different claim is termed collateral estoppel.” (citation 
omitted)); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4416 (“Issue preclusion, moreover, is available 
whether or not the second action involves a new claim or cause of action. If the second action 
involves the same claim or cause of action as the first, issue preclusion may be called direct 
estoppel. If a new claim or cause of action is involved, issue preclusion is commonly called 
collateral estoppel.” (footnote omitted)).
150. Levine, supra note 27, at 440–41 (“The courts have gradually expanded the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, however, to reach beyond court room litigation; for example, courts have 
examined the collateral estoppel effect of findings made in administrative hearings, arbitration 
proceedings, criminal sentencing hearings, partial summary judgment rulings, and default 
judgments.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331
(1979) (abandoning the prohibition on the offensive use of collateral estoppel).
151. See Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Irwin Fin. Corp., No. 08–146 GMS, 2009 WL 763899, at 
*4 (D. Del. Mar. 23, 2009) (“[The first-filed rule’s] purpose is to avoid differing outcomes on the 
same issue by two sister courts, thereby minimizing duplicative litigation in different fora, and 
saving judicial resources.”); Buckley, supra note 29, at 880 (“Numerous policy interests have 
grown up around collateral estoppel. Its present purposes include relieving parties of multiple and 
vexatious litigation, conserving judicial resources, and preventing inconsistent decisions. Further 
contributing to the doctrine’s outline is the recent concern with federal litigation for the public 
benefit.” (footnotes omitted)); Richardson, supra note 23, at 45–46 (“The established common-
law doctrine of collateral estoppel serves several purposes. Specifically, collateral estoppel is 
intended to accomplish the following: conserve judicial resources, preserve the ‘integrity of the 
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availability of issue preclusion152 because it is an effective tool to prevent 
duplicative litigation in a litigious culture and an era of expanding 
dockets.153
Issue preclusion should apply to a federal court’s decision, under the 
first-filed rule, to deny a motion to stay or transfer a case. Courts deciding 
how to rule on this question should depart from the views of the Second, 
Eighth, and Fourth Circuits and stake out new ground by holding that 
issue preclusion applies. All the requirements of issue preclusion are 
satisfied here. A ruling applying the first-filed rule constitutes a 
resolution of “an issue of fact or law actually litigated”: which of two 
suits regarding the same controversy should be litigated.154 Further, a 
ruling on its application constitutes “a valid court determination essential 
to the . . . judgment.”155 Is it not essential to a judgment that a case is 
properly before the court to have entered judgment in the first place?156
Importantly, while claim preclusion requires a final adjudication on the 
merits of a question,157 issue preclusion can apply to the resolution of 
purely interlocutory matters.158 For example, the Second Circuit has 
                                                                                                                     
court’ by preventing inconsistent resolution of issues, promote ‘finality of judgments,’ protect 
defendants from repetitive litigation, ensure that a winning ‘party should not have to fight anew a 
battle it has already won,’ and promote ‘conclusive resolution of disputes.’” (footnotes omitted)).
152. See sources cited supra note 150.
153. See sources cited supra note 151; see also Levine, supra note 27, at 441 (“Several 
factors have driven the expansion of collateral estoppel beyond traditional judicial determinations. 
First, the adjudicative authority, acceptance, and use of administrative hearings, arbitration, and 
other less formal litigation processes have all expanded. Second, the procedural regularity of less 
formal adjudicative processes has increased. Finally, in light of increasingly crowded dockets, 
judicial efficiency has become a higher priority than it was in the past.” (footnotes omitted)).
154. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 
532 U.S. 742, 748–49 (2001)).
155. Id.
156. Courts regularly grant res judicata effect to decisions on a court’s jurisdiction. See 18A 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4430 (“If a defendant appears to challenge personal jurisdiction, 
disposition of the challenge is directly binding as a matter of res judicata. A defendant who 
appears to litigate the merits without properly preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction 
forfeits the right to raise the objection in the initial proceeding and is bound by the resulting 
judgment.”). While decisions on the first-filed rule do not technically resolve questions 
surrounding a court’s jurisdiction, they do similarly speak to the legitimacy of the proceeding and 
thus are directly analogous.
157. See id. § 4434 (“However far traditional views of finality may be relaxed in dealing 
with issue preclusion, the question remains whether any comparable developments will occur 
with respect to claim preclusion. It is often assumed that traditional views will persist as to claim 
preclusion.”).
158. See id. (“Recent decisions have relaxed traditional views of the finality requirement by 
applying issue preclusion to matters resolved by preliminary rulings . . . . There may be settings 
short of trial on the merits in which preclusion is warranted as to fully contested matters that have 
been decided beyond apparent reconsideration, notwithstanding the fact that appellate review will 
be available only at some time in the future.”).
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granted preclusive effect to interlocutory decisions.159 Thus, issue 
preclusion should apply to the interlocutory denial of a motion to stay or
transfer under the first-filed rule.
While a court may feasibly apply the law of the case theory to resolve 
this question, issue preclusion constitutes a better solution because it is 
not discretionary. Law of the case theory suggests that courts abstain from 
overturning prior decisions reached during the same case.160 It is a theory 
which aims to promote judicial consistency.161 The discretionary nature 
of the law of the case theory162 makes it a poor candidate for a workable 
solution. These inter-district conflicts arise precisely because there is too 
much judicial discretion.163 If judges exercising their discretion to 
overrule or outright ignore the decisions of their peers constitutes the 
                                                                                                                     
159. See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(“Whether a judgment, not ‘final’ in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, ought nevertheless be 
considered ‘final’ in the sense of precluding further litigation of the same issue, turns upon such 
factors as the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly tentative), the adequacy of the 
hearing, and the opportunity for review. ‘Finality’ in the context here relevant may mean little 
more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no 
really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again.” (citations omitted)).
160. See 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4478; Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the 
Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit 
Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 342 (2011) (“[T]he law-of-the-case doctrine, intended to foster 
judicial economy, provides that a court (and any coordinate or lower courts as well) will normally 
adhere to a ruling it has declared in a particular action when a party later raises the point again in 
the same action. But this doctrine applies very flexibly, so that the rendering court and coordinate 
courts can revisit the ruling if convinced it was wrong or some other reason counsels 
reconsideration.”).
161. 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4478 (“Law-of-the-case doctrine seems to have 
exploded during the closing decades of the Twentieth Century. The seeming explosion, however, 
is more an effusion of applications than a dramatic development of theory. The basically simple 
principle of disciplined self-consistency that underlies the doctrine continues to establish a firm 
core. The courts are understandably reluctant to reopen a ruling once made. This general 
reluctance is augmented by comity concerns when one judge or court is asked to reconsider the 
ruling of a different judge or court. Reluctance, however, does not equal lack of authority. The 
constraint is a matter of discretion. So long as the same case remains alive, there is power to alter 
or revoke earlier rulings. . . . Law-of-the-case rules have developed to maintain consistency and 
avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.”
(footnote omitted)).
162. See Clermont, supra note 160, at 342 (“[The law of the case theory’s] constraint, 
however, is never really confining. Accordingly, it will not always apply.”).
163. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There is no basis in the record for presuming that the 
court in Alabama did not weigh all these elements in passing on the motions, which called for an 
exercise of the court’s discretion. Nor is there any showing made in this court or below that such 
discretion was abused, even assuming arguendo that it would be proper for this court to consider 
such a claim. What the majority affirms, therefore, is a procedure which grants the plaintiff two 
federal forums in which to present the very same contentions addressed to the court’s discretion. 
If he prevails in either of the two, he is given the relief he desires.”).
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problem, a doctrine emphasizing judicial discretion is not the answer.
Issue preclusion is preferable because it would not permit a U.S. 
District Court judge to overturn or ignore the decision of a peer judge in 
a court of coordinate rank. Unlike Chief Judge Lumbard in his dissenting 
opinion in National Equipment Rental,164 the Fourth Circuit in Ellicott 
did not explicitly discuss claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or any other 
possible means of resolving the problems which inter-district 
disagreements over the application of the first-filed rule raise.165 The 
court appeared very troubled by whether these cases violate federal law 
by constituting inter-district appeals in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1292166
and did not clarify the theoretical grounds for its decision. While the court 
noted that “a party seeking the exercise of a district court’s discretion is 
ordinarily bound by that court’s determination,”167 it nevertheless 
reviewed the lower court decision on an abuse of discretion standard that 
would be inapplicable if issue preclusion applied.168
The most serious flaw in the Fourth Circuit’s Ellicott opinion is that it 
reviews the appeal on an abuse of discretion standard.169 This assumes 
the judge had discretion. Future courts which consider this question 
should take the Fourth Circuit’s analysis a step further and hold that 
decisions regarding whether preclusion applies to a prior court’s
application of the first-filed rule is entitled to de novo review.170 With a 
major exception which is not relevant here,171 issue preclusion is 
reviewed de novo172 and not under an abuse of discretion standard. Thus, 
if judgments applying the first-filed rule are entitled to preclusive effect, 
judges would lack the discretion which has led to the lack of inter-judicial 
comity at the heart of this split among the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Granting preclusive effect to a judgment applying the first-filed rule 
would not contradict Supreme Court precedent. When the Kerotest
                                                                                                                     
164. See supra note 163.
165. See Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Modern Welding Co., 502 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1974).
166. See id. at 181.
167. Id. at 182.
168. See id. at 181 n.4.
169. See id.
170. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4416 (“It should be clear, however, that ordinarily the 
rules of issue preclusion have not turned on any open-ended discretion, and that any movement 
toward rules of discretion should depend on the specific dilemmas of specific preclusion 
problems. The need for clear and reliable preclusion rules must defeat any significant element of 
discretion outside the distinctively risky use of nonmutual preclusion.” (footnote omitted)).
171. See Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Keating, 186 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (“With regard 
to the use of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel in the federal courts, the Supreme Court has 
indicated that it is not precluded, but that trial courts should have broad discretion to determine 
when it should be applied.”).
172. See cases cited supra note 40.
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Manufacturing Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co.173 Court held 
decisions applying the first-filed rule required “an ample degree 
of discretion,” the Court was discussing the appropriate standard for 
ruling on a motion to stay or transfer under the rule.174 Kerotest involved 
a single district court entering a temporary ninety-day stay order and then 
entering an injunction after the ninety days had elapsed.175 The case did 
not involve one district court overturning a peer court’s holding that a 
case should continue before the peer court. The Court neither decided 
whether a court should be bound by a peer court’s ruling on venue nor 
articulated the appropriate standard of review with which a U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals would evaluate the second judge’s refusal to honor the 
first judge’s decision.176 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve this circuit 
split or decide whether issue preclusion applies after a court has entered 
a judgment of this nature.
CONCLUSION
All levels of the federal court system should embrace issue preclusion 
as the best way to resolve district court disagreements about venue. 
Unlike the Second and Eighth Circuits’ approach of simply allowing the 
injunctions, issue preclusion would prohibit district courts from 
overturning each other and stop litigants from using venue disputes to
force adversaries to relitigate the same question across the country. 
Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s approach of calling the injunctions an abuse 
of discretion and allowing the case to proceed in two courts, the 
preclusion solution would ensure that the case proceeds in one forum. 
Because the preclusion solution best combats the threat of duplicative 
litigation, courts should embrace it.
If district court disagreements over venue continue to reach the U.S. 
Circuit Courts of Appeal, the circuits should reverse district courts which 
issue the injunction and hold they should have granted preclusive effect 
to their peers’ earlier decisions. However, even if those U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeal which have yet to confront this question embrace the 
preclusion solution, a circuit split will remain unless the Second, Fourth, 
and Eighth Circuits overturn their opinions in National Equipment 
Rental, Ellicott, and Northwest Airlines, respectively. If this question 
should arise in litigation before the Supreme Court, the Court should 
prevent duplicative litigation from becoming a tool which wealthy 
litigants use to bludgeon less wealthy adversaries into settlement. The 
preclusion solution would best achieve that objective.
                                                                                                                     
173. 342 U.S. 180 (1952).
174. Id. at 182–83.
175. Id. at 181–83.
176. Id. at 182–83.
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